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OPEN HOUSING: TITLE VIII OF THE 1968
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 1 is intended to prevent dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of housing. Title VIII is a detailed statute,
defining with particularity the types of housing involved, the forms of action
which are discriminatory and the remedies which are available. The purpose
of this comment is to examine the operation and implications of the statute.
To that end, it will discuss the four areas of the statute: types of housing
covered, prohibited activity, enforcement and administration, and the rem-
edies provided.
I. TYPES OF HOUSING COVERED BY THE ACT
The types of housing within the purview of Title VIII consist of three
classes, each class being accorded a different date upon which the proscription
against discrimination is to commence. The first category covers any
housing the financing or acquisition of which was provided through the
federal government. 2 This housing includes dwellings owned by the federal
government, dwellings provided through loans or grants secured by the credit
of the federal government, and dwellings made available through state or
local agencies receiving aid for urban renewal.a However, this class does not
include dwellings subject to mortgages held by a Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation or by a Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation institu-
tion merely on the basis of this connection. 4 The prohibition of discrimination
in the sale or rental of this class of dwellings commenced with the enact-
ment of the statute.
The second category of housing consists of all other housing, with the
exception of single family dwellings where the owner does not own or have
an interest in more than three such dwellings at any one time.° Further, if the
owner was not the last occupant prior to the transaction in question and if
he has sold a similar residence within the preceding twenty-four months, the
transaction does not fall within the exception described.? The effective date
for application of the statutory proscription of discrimination in this class
of dwellings is December 31, 1968.
The third category, which comes within the purview of the statutory
proscription after December 31, 1969, consists of dwellings in the sale or
rental of which the owner makes use of the services of a broker, an agent or
1 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. 1968).
2 Id. § 3603 (a) (1) (B).
3 Id. §§ 3603(a) (1) (A), (C), (I)).
4
 Id. § 3603(a) (1) (C).
6 The statute was approved April 11, 1968.
6 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3603(a) (2), (b) (1) (Supp. 1968). The statute forbids such abuses
as placing title to residences in other people's names in order to keep ownership under
the stipulated maximum of three homes; it provides that the seller may not have reserved
to himself, pursuant to any private agreement, any right or title to three or more such
dwellings.
7 Id. § 3603(6)(1).
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an employee of a broker or agent in the business of selling or renting dwell-
ings.8
The statute allows two specific exceptions from the coverage of the
three categories described: first, that a religious group may limit the sale
or rental of dwellings which it owns to members of the same religion;
second, that private clubs may limit to their members rental of any dwellings
maintained as an incident to their primary purpose.° The first exemption is
narrowly drawn with the provision that membership in the particular sect
cannot be limited by considerations of race or national origin. 10 In this way,
possible abuses such as setting up a pseudo-religious organization in order
to exclude potential purchasers or tenants on racial grounds will be mini-
mized. This type of ruse would not be entirely effective, since a member of
a racial minority, by joining the sect, would become eligible to rent or
purchase the dwellings owned by the organization. This attempt to prevent
abuse is not, however, foolproof. A major problem exists in the fact that the
exception is tied to religion. Members of the minorities whom this section is
designed to protect may not, because of personal religious conviction, desire
to join the sect in question, merely to avoid the effect of discrimination.
Therefore, the exception may prove to be a useful tool for the segregationist
despite the inclusion of the open membership condition.
The second exemption, concerning rental of dwellings by private clubs,
may also prove, for the segregationist, to be an escape from the operation of
the statute. It is foreseeable that owners of apartment complexes might
attempt to set up these complexes as private clubs in order to avoid the
ambit of the statute. The statute recognizes this possibility by requiring that
the rental of dwellings be merely incidental to the operation of the club, and
that the dwellings be held for other than commercial purposes. 11 This con-
dition will effectively prevent circumvention by owners of large apartment
complexes where the necessary bookkeeping and rental procedures would
serve as ample evidence of the primarily commercial purposes for which
the apartments are held. However, the smaller the number of units involved,
the easier it would be to disguise the commercial purposes of the arrange-
ment, and to use the exemption as a basis for discrimination. Such a ploy
might be attempted with cooperative apartments, where the tenants as a
group own the building and provide services in common. It would be easy,
through a concerted effort by the tenants, to operate the enterprise in such
a way as to give it the appearance of a private club. This effort might be
made through the formulation of by laws for the operation of the complex
as a club and resort may even be had to incorporation of the complex as a
8 Id. A person in the business of selling or renting is one who is the principal in the
sale of three or more dwellings within a period of twelve months, the agent in the sale
of two or more dwellings other than his own within twelve months, or one who owns a
dwelling which may be occupied by five or more families. Id. § 3603(c). Under § 3602,
a "family" may be merely a single person.
9 Id. § 3607.
10 Id,
11 Id.
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private club. This loophole easily could have been tightened, without serious
impairment of the purpose for which the exception was granted, by inclu-
sion of a condition that any private club seeking to qualify for the exception
must be a non-profit organization. This provision would be an added check
upon persons who attempt to qualify their apartment holdings as private
clubs when they are in fact profit-making commercial ventures. Concededly,
this provision may exclude legitimate private clubs which are profit-making
ventures from enjoyment of the exceptions; but, in view of the reduction in
the number of potential abuses of the exception, the stipulation regarding
profit-making institutions appears justified.
A more fundamental question inheres in the consideration of the
statutory exemptions: why are any exemptions included? One answer is
suggested by the statement of the statutory purpose, "to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
(Emphasis added.)" The draftsmen may have been concerned with whether
the statute, without these exceptions, would be constitutional, since at the
time of its drafting, proscriptions of discrimination had been limited under
the fourteenth amendment to cases where some form of "state action" was
involved."
The question of the constitutionality of a proscription against discrimina-
tion in the sale of a private dwelling has, however, been decided in the
affirmative by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.' 4
 In that case, reviewing the application of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act" as a prohibition of discrimination in the sale of dwellings by
private owners, the Supreme Court found that the thirteenth amendment
empowered Congress to prohibit purely private acts of discrimination." The
power of Congress to prohibit constitutionally the type of activity which is
the subject of these exceptions is, therefore, assured.
Alternatively, the exemptions may have been included as a compromise
within the legislative process to assure passage of the bill. If so, the inclusion
of the exceptions is ironic, since the Supreme Court announced the Jones
decision only two months after congressional approval of the bill in its
present form. And Jones approved a cause of action upon the type of
activity which is the subject of these exceptions, rendering them useless
as shelters for discriminatory activity.'' In any event, the inclusion of these
exceptions impairs achievement of the stated purpose of Title VIII.
12 Id, I 3601 .
13
 See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
14 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
18
 392 U.S. at 437-39.
17 In Jones, the Supreme Court stated that "§ 1982 appears to prohibit all discrim-
ination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property—discrimination by private
owners as well as discrimination by public authorities." 392 U.S. at 421 (emphasis
in original). It therefore appears that a Negro may bring an action under § 1982 for
the type of actions which are excepted under the 1968 Act, such as discrimination by
private clubs or discrimination by a private person owning less than three dwellings.
It should be noted that the cause of action under § 1982 is limited to racial discrimination
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II. PROHIBITED ACTIVITY
The statute describes specific actions as discriminatory and hence un-
lawful. These include denial of sale or rental of a dwelling or discrimination
in the terms of a sale or rental because of race, color, religion or national
origin; advertisement concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling which
gives evidence of an intent to discriminate on these grounds; statements
that a dwelling is not for sale when in fact it is; or participation in block-
busting activities.'s The last three types of activity involve objectively iden-
tifiable acts and therefore would be relatively easy to police. On the
other hand, the first two practices, the denial of sale or rental, or discrimina-
tion in the terms of sale or rental because of race, color, creed or national
origin, are more nebulous since they depend largely upon a determination of
the subjective intent of the person allegedly discriminating.
Because of the problem of subjective intent, proof of violations of these
two provisions will often be difficult. A typical situation would occur where a
person places an ad for the sale of a home but lists no purchase price. When
a member of a minority seeks to purchase the dwelling, the owner purposely
quotes a price higher than he intended to ask in order to discourage the
potential purchaser. Clearly, this behavior would be a violation of the
provision against discrimination in the terms of sale, but the only method
of effective exposure of the violation would be the use of a "tester." Even then
the violator may claim that the change in terms was made in good faith and
not because of considerations of a discriminatory nature. The only method
to assure proof of a discriminatory practice would be the dispatch of a series
of testers, alternating members of the minority with people acceptable to
the seller, and thus revealing a fluctuation in the prices quoted to the various
testers. Since this process can be both expensive and time consuming, poten-
tial purchasers may simply seek other dwellings.
One further problem arises in the application of the provision concern-
ing denial of sale or rental of housing. For example, a developer may make a
good faith effort to create an integrated community through the use of a
plan calling for percentage occupation by minorities. If he refuses to sell or
rent a dwelling to a member of a minority after that minority's quota is
filled, he violates the provision of the statute making it illegal to deny sale
or rental to a person because of race, creed or color." Even though he did not
intend to discriminate, the type of selection necessary to carry out the plan
would, by statutory definition, be discriminatory. Thus, the statute prevents
this method of community integration. The result can be defended, however,
on the ground that assignment of occupation quotas to minorities is merely
another form of discriminatory practice. To be free from discrimination,
minorities must be able to settle wherever and in whatever numbers they
may desire.
and therefore does not reach discrimination prompted by considerations of religion or
national origin, which the 1968 Act does cover. Therefore, any action based upon
discrimination because of religion or national origin must be brought under the 1968 Act.
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (Supp. 1968).
19 Id. § 3604(a).
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Another class of conduct proscribed by the statute is discrimination on
the basis of race, color, creed or national origin in the provision of financial
assistance for the purchase or renovation of a dwelling. This stricture is
necessary since outright purchase of a home is rare in today's real estate mar-
ket. Indeed, it has been estimated that in 1960, over 60 percent of all owner-
occupied dwellings were then subject to some form of financing. 2° The
section adequately prevents flagrant discrimination in financing—the situa-
tion where financing is denied to a member of a racial or religious minority,
yet granted to another person with substantially the same financial creden-
tials. (Here, the violation is obvious and easily established by proof of
the similarity between the two persons and the absence of any other reason
for the refusal of the loan.) Where racial or religious discrimination is the
motive for refusal, the court need only look to the reasonableness of refusal.
Guidelines for the determination of reasonableness are readily available in
the standards of the general banking community, or in the standards of the
institution itself with regard to non-minority borrowers.
The section on prohibited activity presents another problem. Banks and
lending institutions presumably still retain the right to refuse to grant a
loan on the basis of the financial position of an applicant. Financial institu-
tions should not be forced to grant a loan not likely to be repaid. The ques-
tion then arises whether a lending institution might be able to discriminate
in violation of the siatute, using an excuse of poor credit risk as a covering
motive. Many memLers of minority groups, whom Title VIII is designed to
protect, are financially vulnerable to loan refusal ordinarily reasonable under
normal banking standards. 21 The statute therefore offers them little assistance
in obtaining loans, without which they will be unable to purchase a residence.
The Act itself, then, does not guarantee to minorities the purchasing power to
obtain housing. However, within the context of a larger effort by the federal
government to give economic assistance through such agencies for obtaining
housing, as the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administra-
tion programs, the Act serves effectively as a guarantee of an equal opportu-
nity to obtain housing.
Finally, a larger question remains in the statutory treatment of dis-
crimination in financing. That question is whether the provision is intended
to reach solely discrimination arising from the personal prejudices of the
lenders, or whether it is also intended to prevent denial resulting from the
economic effects of community prejudice. In other words, may a bank refuse
to grant a loan because the entry of a minority into the neighborhood in
question will reduce the property values which will in turn impair the value
of the bank's investment? The United States Commission on Civil Rights
has pointed to fear of falling property values as a frequent reason for the
20 In addition, mortgages for the purchase of many other dwellings had probably
been discharged by that time. See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Report 4,
at 28 (1961).
21 Cf. Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114 and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Urban Affairs of th.2 Senate Comm, on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
246 (1967).
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denial of home financing to minorities." While in many cases the denial may
be economically sound, socially it is simply another factor in a continuing
circle of discrimination. This circle must be broken at some point. Property
values will not cease to decline until residents have an opportunity to con-
front the baselessness of the fear of minority entrance into a neighborhood. 23
And this opportunity can only occur when minorities move into these
neighborhoods. However, minorities can move into these neighborhoods only
when lending institutions begin to supply the necessary loans. The obvious
starting point for any attempt to interrupt this cycle is the prevention of
denial of loans on the basis of an anticipated decline in property values occa-
sioned by the applicant's arrival in the neighborhood. Although the statute
does not deal with this point specifically, this type of denial might easily
be labeled discrimination in financial assistance and hence unlawful 24 since
it is visited only upon minority groups because they are minorities.
III. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The powers and duties of administration of Title VIII are vested in
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. 25 Any person seeking
relief under the statute for alleged discriminatory practices is required to file
a written complaint with the Secretary, who must forward a copy of this
complaint to the alleged offender. 2° Within 30 days, and after examination
of the complaint, the Secretary must notify the party filing the complaint
whether the department will take action in the matter. 27 If a state or local
ordinance controls discriminatory housing practices in the locality of the
alleged offense, and if this ordinance supplies rights substantially similar to
those supplied under the federal statute, the Secretary must notify the
appropriate enforcement official under the state or local ordinance." In this
situation, the Secretary will take no further action on the complaint unless
he determines that no action has been taken by the local official or that the
action taken by him is dilatory." If the Secretary determines that further
action on his part is necessary, he must certify that in his opinion such ac-
tion is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. 3° Practically, the
Secretary will probably have little opportunity to follow the progress of
individual cases once they have been referred to the state agencies, so
parties who feel that the complaint is being managed improperly will prob-
ably have to take it upon themselves to notify the Secretary of any defi-
ciencies in the disposition of the case by the local officials.
22 See United States Commission on Civil Rights, Report 4, at 3 (1961).
23 Id.
24 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (Supp. 1968).
25 Id. § 3608(a). The Secretary may delegate any powers or functions devolving
upon him under the statute to employees of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment either singly or in hoards, and he has the power to create rights of appeal
within the Department for the decisions of departmental examiners. Id. § 3608(b).
26 Id. § 3610(a).
27 Id.
28 Id. § 3610(c).
29 Id.
30 Id.
693
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
A. Investigations
In order to probe into the allegations of these complaints, the Secretary
has a full complement of investigatory powers, including the right to subpoena
witnesses and to issue interrogatories.;' A respondent is given the right to
have a reasonable number of subpoenas issued in the Secretary's name. 22
Any witness whom the Secretary may subpoena may within five days petition
the Secretary to modify or revoke the subpoena because it is unreasonable,
or requires the production of irrelevant evidence, or is not of sufficient par-
ticularity. 33
 These investigatory powers are backed by fines up to 1000 dollars
or prison terms of not more than one year for non-compliance with an order
of the Secretary, or for intentionally giving false or misleading testimony
or evidence.34
B. Informal Hearings
If, subsequent to investigation of the allegations of the complaint, the
Secretary decides to take action, the first step must be an attempt to resolve
the conflict through informal means.33 The statute attempts to assure the
efficacy of these informal hearings by providing an atmosphere conducive
to free exchange: nothing said by the parties at the hearings may be used as
evidence against them at a subsequent formal proceeding. 36
This procedure of informal hearings serves a number of useful purposes.
First, it provides for a quick determination of the merits of a claim. Im-
mediate review would help to weed out unfounded or nuisance complaints;
it also supplies the alleged offender with an opportunity to explain his actions
before having to contend with the rigors and expense of formal litigation.
Second, it will in many cases reduce the costs to the disputants. Speedy and
informal hearings will lessen the need for protracted employment of attorneys
and will eliminate lengthy formal pleadings. Another potential economy is
that the hearings are to take place as near as possible to the location of the
alleged infraction.31
 A third advantage of the informal hearing process is that
it will lighten the load of litigation upon the courts. Also, it is to be expected
that the hearing examiners working under the Secretary will quickly develop
expertise in coping with the problems in the area. Finally, it will act as a
deterrent to acts of discrimination since, as a result of the speed and
economy of the system, any party injured by the proscribed conduct will
be able quickly to marshal assistance. The offender can no longer be secure
in the thought that the expense and inherent sluggishness of the legal system
will discourage enforcement by minorities of their rights.
31
 Id. § 3611{6). Witnesses summoned by the Secretary are entitled to the same
mileage and witness fees as are witnesses in proceedings in the United States District
Courts. Id. § 3611(e).
32 Id. § 3611(b).
33 Id. § 3611(d).
34 Id. § 3611(1).
35
 Id. § 3610(a).
36 Id.
37 Id. § 3608(3).
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C. Judicial Proceedings
The person claiming injury may bring an action in the United States
District Court to enforce his rights under the statute. 38 The action may be
brought without regard to the amount in controversy, but it must be com-
menced within ISO days of the alleged discriminatory act and, again, the
plaintiff must have no possibility of redress under a state or local ordinance
supplying rights substantially similar to those supplied by the federal stat-
ute.33 The statute also suggests that the plaintiff must file a complaint with
the Secretary before bringing an action in the district court. 4° A question
arises whether the district court, before deciding the case on the merits, must
wait the 30 days allowed by the statute for the Secretary to take action on
the complaint, or until it is notified that the Secretary does not intend to
take any action. The relevant language in the statute states that "the court
shall continue such civil case .. from time to time before bringing it to
trial if the court believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary or a
State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory settlement of the
discriminatory housing practice complained of. . . . "41 Under the language
cited, the court has the right to decide whether it will hear the case in
light of any conciliatory efforts being made by the Secretary. The court
may decide that no efforts by the Secretary would resolve the complaint, and
then deal with the claim on its merits. Thus the injured party might obtain
relief from the court without having to await action by the Secretary.
D. Remedies
In civil actions brought in the United States District Court, relief may
consist of injunctions, either temporary or permanent, temporary restrain-
ing orders, actual damages and punitive damages up to 1000 dollars where
appropriate.42 Where the dwelling has not been sold or rented, specific relief
may be granted in the form of an injunction ordering the owner either to
sell or rent the dwelling to the plaintiff. A question arises whether such an
order is appropriate where the owner maintains that he has decided to retain
the dwelling himself. The statute implies that such an order would be proper
38 id. §§ 3610(d), 3612(a).
39 Id. § 3610(d). But see Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing:
Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 834, 855-53 (1969).
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(d) (Supp. 1968). The language in section 3612(a) also suggests
the same result: "[T]he court shall continue such civil case . . from time to time
before bringing it to trial if the court believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary
or a State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory settlement of the discrim-
inatory housing practice complained of in the complaint made to the Secretary or to the
local or State agency and which practice forms the basis for the action in court." Id.
§ 3612(a) (emphasis added). But see Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing:
Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 834 (1969), in which it is suggested that § 3612 (a) provides direct access to the courts
without the need to await the results of the conciliatory efforts of the Secretary.
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(a) (Supp. 1968).
42 Id. § 3612(c).
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in language making it unlawful "[t]c) refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer. . . . "43
Where the dwelling in question has been sold in the interim, the problem
remains of calculating the actual damages to the plaintiff, since at common
law every piece of property is presumed to be unique.44 One possible method
for determining relief, which is used in the treatment of damages for breach
of a purchase and sale agreement, is the use of a "cover" theory. The plain-
tiff would acquire another dwelling suitable to his tastes and the measure
of damages would be the difference between the cost of the house acquired
and the value of the residence which was sold plus any expenses incidental
to acquisition of the second dwelling.
In the event that the house has been sold, no action by the district court
may affect the right of a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant of
the dwelling subject to the action. 45 This stipulation can cause serious prob-
lems in cases where the court has decided to continue the case, pending
results of conciliatory efforts by the Secretary. When a complaint is filed
with the Secretary, he has 30 days to conduct conciliatory hearings. Mean-
while, the probability is high that in an active real estate market the dwell-
ing will have been sold or rented to a bona fide purchaser or tenant and that
the court will be left to calculate adequate compensatory damages. The
question arises whether the defendant, upon discovery that the action was
pending, sold the dwelling as quickly as possible. This conduct could, of
course, be dealt with under the punitive damages provision. But how is the
defendant to avoid the possibility of this problem? Must he take the dwelling
off the market upon learning of the controversy? This course of action
would be an economically harsh requirement, especially since there has been
no finding of discrimination. In the case of a real estate agent, it would be
harmful business policy, since he would probably lose his client. Alterna-
tively, perhaps the defendant need only be prepared to prove that no special
effort was made to sell or rent the dwelling.
In any event the problem will be a difficult one for the real estate
dealers until the courts have articulated guidelines in the area. In drawing
these guidelines, the courts must consider the problems of the brokers and
agents as well as those of the party claiming relief. The necessary accom-
modation of interests will inevitably produce some dissatisfaction. In the
meantime, the best course of action for the party seeking relief is probably
to seek, immediately after filing the complaint with the Secretary, a tem-
porary injunction against the sale or rental of the dwelling until the dispute is
settled.
This problem would be greatly alleviated if the court were to take im-
mediate action upon the complaint without awaiting the results of the
conciliatory efforts of the Secretary. In addition, the statute stipulates that
the courts must expedite cases by scheduling hearings at the earliest possible
date. Even if the court decides to await the results of conciliation, this
43 Id. § 3604(a).
44 See, e.g., Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545, 11 N.W. 732 (1882).
46 42 U.S.C.A. 3612 (a) (Sapp. 1968).
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action does not preclude the possibility of granting a temporary injunction
against the sale of the house. Therefore, by temporarily enjoining sale, the
court could allow the informal hearings, with their attendant advantages,
to continue.
E. Enforcement by the Attorney General
The final enforcement provision gives the United States Attorney Gen-
eral the power to institute a civil action for an injunction against conduct
which he finds to constitute a pattern of discrimination in violation of the
statute.40
 He may obtain permanent or temporary injunctions as well as
restraining orders to prevent such conduct and to guarantee "the full enjoy-
ment of the rights granted by this title." 47
CONCLUSION
Title VIII attempts to provide fair housing through specific proscriptions
of types of discriminatory action, with provision for relief where these
proscriptions are violated. Conceptually, the relief granted is adequate to
carry out the purposes of the Act. The effectiveness of the statute, however,
is limited by the exceptions which the statute specifically allows. Fortunately,
the Supreme Court in the Jones decision has provided an alternative basis
for a cause of action for discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of
housing. This alternative, which is not subject to these statutory limita-
tions,48
 will in many cases supply a remedy for the shortcomings of Title
VIII. It will not be surprising, therefore, to find many cases abandoning the
cause of action granted by Title VIII in favor of obtaining relief under the
Jones application of the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.49
WILLIAM N. HURLEY
46 Id. § 3613.
47 Id.
48 See note 17 supra.
49 See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, — F. Supp. — (D. Mass. 1969), in which the court
granted an injunction specifically requiring the defendant to rent an apartment in a
two-family dwelling to the plaintiff.
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